

Workshop on Gossip, Reputation, and Honesty

17-18 May, 2018

Budapest, Hungary


<http://recens.tk.mta.hu/en/gossip-workshop-2018>

Venue:

Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences

Address: 1097 Tóth Kálmán u. 4., Budapest, Hungary

T wing, 2nd floor meeting room



OVERVIEW PROGRAM

17 May, 2018 Thursday

8.45-9.00 Registration, ground floor

9.00-9.10 Opening by Tamás Rudas, General Director of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences

9.10-10.10 Invited lecture 1: Dan Balliet, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam: (A) Theoretical Approach to Understanding Gossip

Chair: Paul van Lange

10.10-11.10 Presentations: Reviews

Bianca Beersma, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam: How Gossip Shapes the Functioning and Performance of Organizational Groups: Towards an Integrative Theoretical Framework

Szabolcs Számadó, HAS CSS RECENS: Honesty and Gossip

Gordon Patrick Dunstan Ingram, University of Andes: False Gossip, Fake News, Witchcraft, and Terrorism: The Role of Negativity Bias in Social Control

11.10-11.30 Coffee and tea break

Chair: Francesca Giardini

11.30-12.50 Presentations: Experiments

Paul van Lange, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam: Reputation and Religiosity

Peter Bednarik, Vienna University of Economics and Business: Reputation-Based Partner Choice Enhances Indirect Reciprocity

Flóra Samu, HAS CSS RECENS: Exchange of Reputational Information and Cooperation: A Laboratory Experiment

Elena Martinescu, University of Groningen: A Double Edged Sword: Negative Gossip Promotes Strategic Contributions from Targets

12.50-14.30 Lunch break

14.30-15.30 Invited lecture 2: Francesca Giardini, University of Groningen: Power to the Triad! A Mechanism-Based Approach to the Interplay between Gossip, Reputation and Cooperation

15.30-15.50 Coffee break

Chair: Srebrenka Letina

15.50-16.50 Presentations: Simulations and Text of Gossip

Károly Takács, HAS CSS RECENS: Social Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity

Júlia Galántai, HAS CSS RECENS: The Content of Informal Communication: Topic Modelling on a Spontaneous Speech Corpus

Cristian Manuel Santibañez Yañez, Diego Portales University / Catholic University of Chile, Santiago: Gossip, Self-Deception and Persuasion

16.50-18.00 Group discussion in multidisciplinary groups

19.40 Assembling at Kálvin tér, statue of Calvin for the workshop dinner, M Flat Restaurant



18 May, 2018 Friday

9.10-10.10 Invited lecture 3: Gerben van Kleef, University of Amsterdam: How Norm Violations Damage Reputation Yet Boost Social Power

Chair: Eliza Bodor-Eranus

10.10-11.10 Presentations: Qualitative Studies of Gossip

Judit Durst, UCL and HAS CSS: The Role of Gossip and Rumour Publics in Migration Decision-Making among Hungarian Roma

Zsuzsanna Szvetelszky, HAS CSS RECENS: Blue-Collar Perceptions about Workplace Gossip

Erzsébet Fanni Tóth, Sigmund Freud University, Vienna: Gossip as a Stepping-Stone in Immigrant Communities of Women

11.10-11.30 Coffee and tea break

Chair: Gerben van Kleef

11.30-12.50 Presentations: Gossip in Organizations and Schools

Maria Dijkstra, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam: Rumor Has It. Or Does It? Uncertainty and Organizational Trust and Their Relationship with Perceived Quality Change-Related Information and Rumors

Tanja Slišković, University of Zagreb: Do Brokers Gossip Less? Investigating Information Sharing and Control in Organizational Gossip Networks Using Exponential Random Graph Models

Asami Shinoara, Nagoya University: When Do Children Begin to Utilize Gossip to Evaluate Others?

Dorottya Kisfalusi, HAS CSS RECENS: Negative Gossip and Competition for Reputation among Adolescents

12.50-14.30 Lunch break

14.30-15.30 Invited lecture 4: Dirk Semmann, University of Göttingen: An Evolutionary Perspective on Reputation in Humans

15.30-15.50 Coffee break

15.50-16.20 Group presentations

16.20-17.00 Future directions, business meeting, summary of the conference

Facultative program:

19.00- beers at ExtraBudapest ruin pub: extrabudapest.hu, Klauzál u. 15.

ABSTRACTS

17 May, 2018 Thursday

9.10-10.10 INVITED LECTURE 1

Dan Balliet

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(A) Theoretical Approach to Understanding Gossip

A wealth of modeling work now suggests that reputation-based indirect reciprocity is one possible route by which humans evolved to cooperate in larger-scale social networks and societies. In this talk, I will discuss two directions of my current and future research on gossip. The first approach involves an attempt to link selectionist models of indirect reciprocity to adaptationist accounts of gossip. Here I will highlight some future theoretical issues in understanding gossip. Second, I will share some early results of our experience sampling study of gossip in everyday life. Although many researchers have stressed how ubiquitous gossip is in everyday life, no research has systematically studied the content and context of gossip. Documenting what people gossip about and the relationship contexts in which they gossip can deliver facts our theories of gossip must explain and even potentially guide our theorizing about gossip.

10.10-11.10 PRESENTATIONS: REVIEWS

Bianca Beersma

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How Gossip Shapes the Functioning and Performance of Organizational Groups: Towards an Integrative Theoretical Framework

Gossip, evaluative talk about absent third parties, is omnipresent in organizational groups. At the same time, it is often seen as bad and immoral behavior. A number of empirical studies support this view by pointing to negative relationships between gossip and intrateam trust, psychological safety, cooperation and viability. However, some researchers have also claimed that gossip is virtuous behavior that is functional for group outcomes, pointing to experimental findings that demonstrate that gossip can enable the exchange of reputational information, and thereby can enhance cooperation in groups. Currently, there is no theory that can explain when and why gossip is a dysfunctional or functional force in organizational groups. In this presentation, I therefore present a new theoretical framework, the Gossip Origins, Subsequent Social Information Processing, and Performance (GOSSIP)-framework that views gossip in organizational groups as a multi-level phenomenon: It systematically connects individual gossipers' intentions to group-level outcomes via social information processing by gossip recipients. Specifically, the framework proposes 1) that group members may gossip to benefit themselves or their group (proself vs. prosocial intentions, or motives), 2) that recipients' reactions to gossip are affected by how they perceive senders' motives, and that these reactions in

turn affect group-level processes, and 3) that how these processes affect group performance depends on the type of group task. I discuss how examining propositions derived from the framework can enable the field of gossip research to resolve divergent perspectives on the outcomes of gossip for groups.

Szabolcs Számadó

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Honesty and Gossip

The understanding of how and why animals produce honest signals is a key issue in biology. In the first part of the talk I briefly review the most frequent proximate mechanisms that can generate honest signalling in animal communication systems. Human language is substantially different from animal communication, yet the problem of honesty applies here as well. Gossip is frequently used in situations with conflict of interest and deception is not unusual. However, this issue is often overlooked when modelling gossip, generating overly optimistic outcomes. Here I show with the example of indirect reciprocity that dishonest gossip can alter the outcome cooperative interactions and it can lead to the collapse of cooperation. Yet, people in real life readily gossip and listen to it even if there is a chance of deception. This suggests that gossip can be useful even under conflict of interest. Here I evaluate potential mechanisms that can promote the honesty of gossip under such circumstances.

Gordon Patrick Dunstan Ingram

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False Gossip, Fake News, Witchcraft, and Terrorism: The Role of Negativity Bias in Social Control

In this paper I examine two popular stereotypes about gossip – (i) that it is generally negative; (ii) that it is often false – and relate them to other social phenomena. We know from both empirical and modelling studies that neither of these stereotypes is likely true; so why do they persist? A common answer is that they are just arbitrary semantic associations of the concept “gossip” in modern Western culture. Yet similar stereotypes about gossip can be seen in ancient and anthropological literature. Here I provide two reasons why these stereotypes are so widespread and persistent: (a) negativity bias is a general feature of human psychology, meaning that children are more likely to comment on negative behavior of peers than on positive or neutral behavior; and (b) this contributes to children growing up into adults who mistrust the motives of other people’s third-party social communication. The link to social control is that leaders tolerate negative gossip and rumors because they create fear (which in social contexts is a signal of low position in a hierarchy) and help justify their leadership. In societies at a certain level of integration, this phenomenon can be seen in witchcraft beliefs; and in more modern societies, in the spread of fake news – e.g. about minority groups’ involvement in terrorism. At the same time, leaders must discourage belief in rumors critical of themselves by labelling them false. I will show how these two drives, superficially contradictory, are actually complementary because they appeal to different mental processes.

11.30-12.50 PRESENTATIONS: EXPERIMENTS

Paul van Lange

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Reputation and Religiosity

Human cooperation is key to well-functioning communities. In the real world, two broad expressions of human cooperation include prosocial behavior, such as donations of time or money to charity, and norm compliance, such as keeping the environment clean by not littering. Yet very little is known what predicts human cooperation in natural real-world settings, and whether predictors at the level of the individual also help us understand what it is that makes communities cooperative. Here we examine the relative ability of population density and religiosity, two powerful predictors of human cooperation, to predict donating money at the doorstep and norm violations. We report a large-scale field study assessing charitable donations at the doorstep (amount in euros, Study 1) and norm violations (number of fines, Study 2) in all districts (N= 382) of the Netherlands. Study 1 finds that donations were significantly predicted by population density (27%), and not at all by religiosity (0%). Donations were higher in districts with lower population density. Study 2 examines norm violations (e.g., littering or illegal

parking) for which people were fined. All six variables significantly predicted norm violations, but differed strongly in the variance they accounted for. Population density (16%) explained the most variance, whereas religiosity only modestly predicted norm violations (3%). In both studies, variables such as age, net income, or education provided modest contributions, not exceeding 5%. Findings are discussed in terms of mechanisms underlying the evolution of cooperation, with special emphasis on reputation and indirect reciprocity.

Peter Bednarik - Dirk Engelmann - Urs Fischbacher - Jean-Robert Tyran

Presenter: Peter Bednarik

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Reputation-Based Partner Choice Enhances Indirect Reciprocity

Reputation-based indirect reciprocity has been put forward as one of the key mechanisms to promote pro-social behavior. However, suggested evolutionary explanations are either vulnerable to invasion by players who strategically build a reputation, or demand information processing ability of players that appears to be unrealistic, or require complicated patterns of interaction. We propose a comparatively simple mechanism for the emergency and survival of indirect reciprocity. Specifically, we introduce competition in a helping game. Following previous simulation studies and experiments, in this game “donors” can increase the payoffs of “recipients” at a cost to themselves and donor and recipient roles are assigned independently across periods. Donors can observe the image score of the recipients, which is the record of their previous behavior in the role of a donor. In contrast to previous studies, donors can choose which recipient to help. In a baseline treatment, donors are randomly assigned to recipients as in previous experiments. In the competition treatment donors can choose which recipient to help, if at all. Donors get information on the recipients’ last five, three or one action(s), which we refer to as history length. Overall, partner choice increased helping behavior, but we find interesting differences among different history lengths.

Flóra Samu - Károly Takács - Szabolcs Számadó

Presenter: Flóra Samu

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Exchange of Reputational Information and Cooperation: A Laboratory Experiment

A human solution to the problem of cooperation is the construction and emergence of informal reputation hierarchies. Reputational mechanisms can contribute to cooperation by providing credible guidelines about previous group-beneficial or free-rider behavior of opponents in social dilemma interactions. In this study, we conducted a laboratory experiment, in which participants played two-person Prisoner's Dilemma games. They could observe some other interactions and communicate reputational information about possible prospective opponents to each other. In parallel with previous studies, we have found that simply the possibility of exchanging information have already increased the level of cooperation. Furthermore, reputational scores that have been translated into monetary rewards were able to strengthen this effect. Reputational information influenced cooperative behavior, regardless of previous decisions of the target of information. The impact of reputational information correlated with the perceived reliability of the evaluation system. Our experimental results support the hypothesis that reputational mechanisms could have contributed to the emergence of large scale cooperation among humans.

Elena Martinescu - Wiebren Janssen - Bianca Beersma

Presenter: Elena Martinescu

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A Double Edged Sword: Negative Gossip Promotes Strategic Contributions from Targets

Negative gossip may be categorized as prosocial behavior, because it has been shown to protect groups against selfish or uncooperative individuals (Feinberg et al, 2012; Sommerfeld et al, 2007). However, we know relatively little about how gossip is understood by its targets (i.e. people whom gossip is about). Targets' gossip experiences may predict their adherence to the group values and norms, their relationship with the group, and their willingness to contribute to the group. The present research clarifies how targets experience negative gossip, and what are the consequences for sustainable, intrinsically motivated cooperation. In three studies (a correlational study, N = 592, a scenario study, N = 553, and an experiment, N = 85), we investigated targets' reactions to negative gossip. Results consistently indicated that negative gossip targets felt socially excluded and experienced negative emotions. Gossip targets expressed high work effort intentions (behaviors visible to others), but low contributions that were voluntary (organizational citizenship behaviors) or unobservable to others (private donations to group members). Furthermore, by decreasing their feelings of social inclusion, gossip lowered targeted individuals' psychological well-being, work engagement, and subjective sense of performance. Our findings showed that negative gossip pressured targeted individuals to conform to group norms and strive to increase their visible group contributions. However, gossip targets were unlikely to perceive

gossip as benign and well-intended (i.e., prosocial), but rather as harmful to them. As such, we propose that prosocial gossip is a less effective mechanism for creating sustainable cooperation than recent studies claim it to be.

14.30-15.30 INVITED LECTURE 2

Francesca Giardini

University of Groningen, Faculty of Behavioral and Social Sciences

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Power to the Triad! A Mechanism-Based Approach to the Interplay between Gossip, Reputation and Cooperation

Both gossip and reputation are key ingredients for the functioning of human collectives, in particular in relation to prosocial behavior and the creation, maintenance and decay of cooperative relationships. Even if both phenomena have been thoroughly investigated by scholars from disciplines as different as biology, economics, psychology and sociology, the relationship between the two and their link with cooperation has received less attention. In this talk I will use the gossip triad (Gossiper, Target and Receiver) as an analytical tool to disentangle the complex interrelationships between gossip, reputation, and cooperation, while taking into account the social and cultural context in which they are embedded. Focusing on the three roles in the gossip triad makes it possible to distinguish (a) individual motives behind gossiping, (b) its reputation effects on the actors, (c) the impact of gossip and reputation on the quality and sustainability of cooperation, and (d) the role of the context. Applying this framework reveals a deep divide between reputation and punishment models propagated by experimental economics and evolutionary psychology on the one hand, and coalition and control models informed by sociology on the other hand. Although very abstract, such a framework can be usefully applied to derive theoretical predictions about the multiple connections between gossip, reputation and cooperation.

15.50-16.50 PRESENTATIONS: SIMULATIONS AND TEXT OF GOSSIP

Simone Righi - Károly Takács

Presenter: Károly Takács

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Social Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity

Direct and indirect reciprocity are good candidates to explain the fundamental problem of evolution of cooperation. In the Prisoner's Dilemma played in simple networks we confirm that, when present, direct reciprocity gains dominance over indirect reciprocity strategies, also in larger populations as long as it has no memory constraint. In the absence of direct reciprocity or when its memory is flawed, different forms of indirect reciprocity emerge as dominating while still being able to support cooperation. We show that indirect reciprocity relying on social capital inherent in closed triads is the best competitor among them, outperforming indirect reciprocity that uses information from any source. Results hold in a wide range of conditions with different evolutionary update rules, extent of evolutionary pressure, initial conditions, population size, and density.

Boróka Pápay - Bálint György Kubik - Károly Takács - Júlia Galántai

Presenter: Júlia Galántai

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The Content of Informal Communication: Topic Modelling on a Spontaneous Speech Corpus

Humans are characterized by their exceptional complexity of communication. Gossip is one of the most widespread human activities with multiple functions such as enhancing human cooperation, establishing social order, information sharing, norm enhancing or stress reduction. Gossip has been analysed mostly by qualitative or survey methods. In this paper, we describe a quantitative approach to identify major topics of human informal communication in a large corpus containing spontaneous talk with LDA topic modelling. We describe the topics emerged and compare them to theory-based predefined dictionaries. We highlight that a significant portion of informal communication is about third parties who are not present. We identify gossip and its characteristics. We describe the specific topics that distinguish gossiping and non-gossip texts in our large spontaneous speech corpora.

Cristian Manuel Santibañez Yañez

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Gossip, Self-Deception and Persuasion

In this presentation I will analyse the obstacle for honest communication that self-deception may represent when it is used in a persuasive context. By using a Spanish humorous TV program, I will also show that gossip is sometimes a specific self-deceptive strategy in a persuasive context. The gossip strategy is used in order to build evidence when this is not straightforward. The theoretical background of this presentation combines psychology of reasoning and evolutionary perspectives on deception. Self-deceptive psychological behavior is firstly explained by using the idea that the brain is composed of mutually inconsistent modules that contain online contradictory beliefs, and secondly, it is explained as part of an evolutionary stable group strategy. Specifically, I will discuss recent hypotheses regarding this prevaricative structure of the mind, such as that of Kurzban (2012), who has proposed that the mind functions strategically in a misleading way for persuasive purposes. As Kurzban (2012: 130) points out, “some part of the mind –some modules – are designed for functions other than being right because of certain strategic advantages”. Trivers (2011) maintains a similar view, considering that in order to lie we hide or disguise relevant information, and particularly, we disguise our intention to deceive, which is the easiest to do by means of a self-deceptive mechanism.

18 May, 2018 Friday

9.10-10.10 INVITED LECTURE 3

Gerben van Kleef

University of Amsterdam, Department of Social Psychology

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How Norm Violations Damage Reputation Yet Boost Social Power

Norms uphold the social order by guiding behavior without the force of laws. Behaviors that violate norms therefore pose a potential threat to organizations and societies. Accordingly, norm violations often trigger negative reactions in observers, such as unfavorable impressions, moral outrage, and gossip. Despite these reputational detriments, norm violations are omnipresent. I propose that one reason why norm violations persist is that they afford benefits for actors in terms of their social power. In this talk I will present an ongoing line of research on the effects of norm violations on perceptions of power and leadership support. First, I will present evidence that individuals who violate social norms are perceived as more powerful than those who abide by the rules. Second, I will elucidate when observers are willing to actively grant power to norm violators by supporting them as leaders. A number of interrelated research projects indicate that the effects of norm violations on power affordance depend on (1) the prosociality of the norm violation (i.e., whether it benefits others), (2) the hierarchical position of the observer (i.e., high or low power or social-economic status), (3) the type of norm that is violated (i.e., societal level or group level), and (4) the cultural context of the norm violation (i.e., variations in individualism-collectivism and tightness-looseness). I will discuss implications for understanding the perpetuation of norm-violating behavior in organizations and society at large.

10.10-11.10 PRESENTATIONS: QUALITATIVE STUDIES OF GOSSIP

Judit Durst

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The Role of Gossip and Rumour Publics in Migration Decision-Making among Hungarian Roma

“They said one can earn hundreds of thousands a week in Canada, so I tried my luck”: Since 2008, when Canada lifted its visa requirement, about three quarter of the Gypsy colony (approximately 1500 people) of Peteri, a small town in North Hungary, has been partaken in transnational migration with the destination of Toronto. This article addresses the role of gossip and ‘rumour publics’ (Harney 2006) in the spread of the ‘migration culture’ and of the perpetuation of transnational mobility among a population facing social and economic marginality which, according to the academic literature, has little migration potential. Drawing on intermittent ethnographic fieldwork, both in Peteri and in Toronto, by living together with and conducting in-depth interviews (80) among returned and current migrants in the course of the last 3 years, this paper argues that rumour is to be seen as a word of mouth communicative device among the marginalised groupings which serves as a central form of knowledge distribution. For marginalised Roma, it offers information, through repetition, under circumstances of generalised

uncertainty and in the context of scarce official news, about the opportunities and risks of how to make a living in Canada. Here we analyse two specific rumours, widely spread in the transnational rumour publics among Hungarian Roma. The first is about the opportunities the Canadian economy offers. The second is about the nature and shifting of the Canadian refugee regime. This latter one is practiced in the transnational field by established migrants who disseminate “unsubstantiated” information – mainly through social media (Facebook)- as a way of gatekeeping to keep away unwanted newcomers. My ethnographic case study shows that for potential migrants, with low amount of human capital and not even a basic knowledge of any foreign language, rumours (spread by established and new migrants) as representations of mobility strategies and of money-making practises in a transnational social field, provide a key source of news which credibility is assessed against their former experiences and the trustworthiness of the news giver. The power of these rumours lies in the observation (Stewart and Strathern 2004) that they create worlds as much as social “facts” do, therefore they encourage action.

Zsuzsanna Szvetelszky

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Blue-Collar Perceptions about Workplace Gossip

In the past decade I have managed qualitative studies in numerous factories with both in-depth interview and focus group methodologies. Throughout these studies I gathered a great amount of experience about the perceptions of blue-collar workers with regards to gossip. In my presentation, I would like to talk about these perceptions. According to the literature, workplace gossip has traditionally been labelled negative, its positive aspects began receiving recognition only recently. Gossip is neither negative, nor positive – its value varies. While formal communication always has its inertia, gossip transforms: when a piece of uncertain news spreads through gossip, it transforms so as to make sense to the group. Regarding groups at the workplace, we can speak of communication as formal or informal, horizontal or vertical, bottom-up or top-down, internal or external dimension. Internal is usually related to satisfaction, job safety, staff replacement. External is about the company’s environment, reputation and stability. There are generally two company cultures: one that is declared and another that is followed. The former means the ideals professed explicitly, the latter is defined by members’ behavior, emotions and thoughts. Declared values are conscious, those followed are less so. Gossip reveals the values a company is ruled by in reality. Through gossip, groups express and sustain their principal values and regulate inner conflicts. Corporate gossip is a primary form of informal communication - understanding its mechanisms within the organization is a key tool in the hands of a leader.

Erzsébet Fanni Tóth

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Gossip as a Stepping-Stone in Immigrant Communities of Women

This case study illustrates how gossip can be utilised to develop and maintain a group belongingness and expert status in the migrant online and offline community. Strategic and participant observation was applied in order to understand the role of gossip in communication means of Hungarian female financial and legal experts in closed Facebook groups of Hungarian speaking mothers living in Austria versus in offline meetings of Hungarian professional women's association. The results indicate that the strategies of approaching gossips related to financial and legal aspects of life in Austria are powerful tools in the hands of highly educated women for maintaining their national and maternal identity (insider status) but at the same time also for establishing their expert (outsider) status. Besides, the online spread of the popular misconceptions about e.g. family benefits of the Austrian state is frequently utilised by them as a stepping-stone to the host society. The more the gossip spreads, the more frequently a related question is coined online, the more they can step in to build bridges between the Austrian authorities/companies and the not yet integrated anonym masses of newly arriving Hungarians. Finally, the ability of recognising facts from misconceptions creates powerful bonds between professional women of Hungarian origin, who then step out of the online forums, and organise face-to-face meetings. These offline networks are built upon the fractures of the less and the more integrated Hungarians, among others on (the lack of) foreign language skills, blue vs. white collar employment, etc.

11.30-12.50 PRESENTATIONS: GOSSIP IN ORGANIZATIONS AND SCHOOLS

Alix F.N. Konijn - Maria T. M. Dijkstra - Bianca Beersma

Presenter: Maria Dijkstra

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Organization Sciences

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Rumor Has It. Or Does It? Uncertainty and Organizational Trust and Their Relationship with Perceived Quality Change-Related Information and Rumors

This paper is about the dynamics of informal communication during organizational change. We studied the report of rumors - unverified and instrumentally relevant information statements circulating in the workplace during organizational change. We focused specifically on experienced uncertainty and organizational (dis)trust in relation to the perceived quality of change communication. We hypothesized that the experience of uncertainty and organizational trust during organizational change is related to the report of rumors. We predicted that perceptions of quality change-related communication (QCC) would serve as a mediator in this relationship. The research was conducted using a survey (n=115) within a multinational company in the financial services industry based in the Netherlands. During the research period, the company was undergoing major organizational change due to changes in the regulatory system

and technological advances. We found significant relationships between uncertainty, organizational trust, QCC and the report of rumors. QCC partially mediated the relationship between uncertainty and the report of rumors as well as the relationship between organizational trust and the report of rumors. Hence, when employees experienced more uncertainty and less organizational trust, they perceived less QCC and reported more rumors. Although organizational change literature often addresses core characteristics of change communication, our findings suggested that change-related communication is not just about the design and content of change-related information, but also about employees' perception of the change-related this information which is shaped by the experience of uncertainty and organizational trust. Based on these results, we elaborate on the possible functions of rumors during organizational change.

Tanja Slišković - Károly Takács - Boróka Pápay

Presenter: Tanja Slišković

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Do Brokers Gossip Less? Investigating Information Sharing and Control in Organizational Gossip Networks Using Exponential Random Graph Models

We advance the scholarship on social network brokerage theory and information control. Brokers in social networks connect otherwise unconnected people. Brokerage is a central concept in social network theory and research, since it has been shown to bring an array of benefits to individuals who occupy the brokerage position. Hence, it has been suggested brokers are in a position of control, and ultimately power. However, this assumption has not been substantially empirically proven. Our study tests this assumption by observing how brokers behave and which information they share in an organizational gossip network. If brokers really do control information, the hypothesis is they will receive more, but share less with their networks. Additionally, in order to maintain their high-status brokerage position, brokers will spread gossip about other brokers. Using exponential random graph modelling, on data from six organizational units in Hungary, with self-reported network surveys of size 20-30, we investigate gossip behaviors of brokers.

Asami Shinohara - Yasuhiro Kanakogi - Yuko Okumura - Tessei Kobayashi

Presenter: Asami Shinoara

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When Do Children Begin to Utilize Gossip to Evaluate Others?

Gossip enables individuals to decide how to interact with members of their social group even when unable to directly observe their past behavior. Previous studies have shown that adults use gossip to choose partners or decide to cooperate with others, which results in high cooperation in groups (e.g. Feinberg et al., 2014). However, it remains unclear when children utilize gossip in this way. In this study, we investigated the developmental origin of the use of negative gossip (i.e. gossip about another's antisocial behavior): how five- and seven-year-old children behave toward others who are gossiped about, focusing on reward and trust behavior. We showed the

participants video about three puppets: 1) the puppet behaves antisocially (firsthand-negative-observation condition), 2) the puppet is gossiped about behaving antisocially (negative-gossip condition), and 3) the puppet is gossiped about behaving neutrally (neutral-gossip condition). We asked the participants to rank the three puppets in order of deserving being rewarded, and deserving being trusted. Then, the participants evaluated the three puppets using a five-point Likert scale. We confirmed that participants of both ages understood the video content accurately. They evaluated the two antisocial puppets more negatively than the neutral puppet. However, only the seven-year-olds trusted and rewarded the puppet in the neutral-gossip condition more than the other two puppets. Our results demonstrate that it is at around seven years of age that children can utilize gossip to decide how to interact with others. This indicates the seven-year-olds may already engage in enhancing cooperation through gossip.

Dorottya Kisfalusi - Károly Takács - Judit Pál

Presenter: Dorottya Kisfalusi

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Negative Gossip and Competition for Reputation among Adolescents

Adolescence is an important age of development when collective norms emerge, social exclusion often takes place, and competition for reputation is relatively intense. Negative gossip is used with increasing intentionality to interfere in these processes. At the same time, being the object of negative gossip undermines chances to obtain good reputation. In this chapter, we review the role of gossiping in the formation of informal status relations of adolescents. We provide an overview of theoretical explanations and empirical findings on how reputation and gossip are related with a special focus on the school context. We present recent methodological advancements of social network methods used for analysing the complex interrelated dynamics of gossip, reputation, and peer relations among adolescents. As an illustration, we show that malicious gossip leads to disdain while disdain induces malicious gossip in a longitudinal analysis of Hungarian secondary school classes. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our illustrative analysis and formulate suggestions for future research.

14.30-15.30 INVITED LECTURE 4

Dirk Semmann

University of Göttingen, Courant Research Center "Evolution of Social Behavior", Research Group "Evolution of Cooperation and Prosocial Behavior"

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An Evolutionary Perspective on Reputation in Humans

The evolution of cooperation to ubiquitous state has been in the focus of research in the last 20 years and it is not so puzzling any more. Although cooperation is a widespread phenomenon in nature, human cooperation exceeds that of all other species regarding the scale and range of cooperative activities. Especially the effects of reputation, gossip and punishment on cooperation has shed light on evolutionary stability of the extremely high cooperation levels in humans. One of the main reasons why humans have been able to reach these levels is the ability to communicate about the behavior of third parties in their absence and thereby using reputation to make indirect reciprocity work. In this talk I will give an overview of our work on reputation and a little bit about gossip.

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